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ABSTRACT
Focusing on the impulsive act, this essay analyzes the relationship between the
temporality of decision making and the determination of social context in
Hardy’s A Pair of Blue Eyes (1873), The Woodlanders (1887), and Tess of the
D’Urbervilles (1891). While critics often note the entrapment of Hardy’s
characters in contexts such as social class and gender, this article contends
that the impulsive act can only be explained contextually after it has already
occurred. The irreducibility of the impulsive act to a rational explanation
(social or natural determinism, historical necessity) gives rise to a
counterfactual imagination that feeds off the contingency of a decision that
might have been made differently or not at all. The power of these
counterfactuals attests to a shift in the centre of agency away from the
urgency of decision making to the more reflective, imaginative rewriting of a
past that could have been. By doing so, Hardy’s characters exhibit the most
agency when they act like authors, viewing themselves as fictional characters
that can be written or rewritten.
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When Angel Clare asks Tess to be his wife, he carefully words his proposal so
‘that she might not think he had yielded to an impulse of which his head
would disapprove’.1 Opposing ‘impulse’ and ‘head,’ Angel’s proposal takes a
rational form that conceals the turbulent affects that gave rise to it: the turn
to reason, he believes, provides a more persuasive ground than the shifting
currents of impulsivity. Though repressed, affect enables Angel’s proposal
by allowing him to ignore the contextual obstacles – such as social class
and heredity – that would prevent the marriage of a middle-class farmer
and milkmaid. Occurring after the impulsive decision, rationalisation poses
as having ontological priority – replacing the contingency of what might-
have-been with the assurance of a singular choice. Focusing on the impulsive
act, this essay analyzes the relationship between the temporality of decision
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making and the determination of social context in Hardy’s A Pair of Blue Eyes
(1873), The Woodlanders (1887), and Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891). While
critics often note the entrapment of Hardy’s characters in contexts such as
social class and gender, I argue that the impulsive act – like Angel’s above
– can only be explained contextually after it has already occurred. The irredu-
cibility of the impulsive act to a rational explanation gives rise to a counter-
factual imagination empowered by the contingency of a decision that might
have been made differently (or not at all). These counterfactuals attest to a
shift in the centre of agency away from the urgency of decision making to
the more reflective rewriting of a past that could have been. By doing so,
Hardy’s characters exhibit the most agency when they act like authors,
viewing themselves as fictional characters that can be written or rewritten.
Critics provide many accounts of agency in Hardy’s work. Michael Valdez
Moses, Deana Kreisel, and Andrew Radford show how tradition persists in
shaping the present contexts of decision making for Hardy’s characters.2
Kaja Silverman and William Cohen focus on how biology and the natural
world determine the limits of agency.3 Though Hardy seems to undermine
individual choice in relation to overwhelming external forces, he provides a
more dynamic model of agency grounded in the relation between counterfac-
tual contexts and the temporality of decision making. Impulsive behaviour
serves as a hinge where his characters confront the indeterminacy between
choice and context. Compressing the decision-making interval to a span of
imperceptible duration, an impulse happens but can only be registered after
its occurrence. Kay Young observes that Hardy’s novels make ‘impulse the
primary mental state of its characters and its effects a primary motivating
force of plot’.4 Analysing the privilege of feeling over thought in Jude the
Obscure, Young suggests that the novel makes mood the individual’s way of
dealing with the reality of a cruel world. While Young identifies the impor-
tance of impulsive action in Hardy’s work, she does not examine how impul-
sivity temporarily lifts characters out of the contexts that determine
behaviour. The impulsive interval enables Hardy’s characters to treat them-
selves as characters – to give them the autonomy of an author over their
fictional creation.
According to the affect theorist Brian Massumi, an impulse ‘happens too
quickly for it to have happened’: it overrides contextual specificity and is irre-
ducible to the determinism of biology or tradition.5 As such, impulsive actions
posit counterfactual contexts as the measure of one’s agency, destabilising the
ontological priority of the actual over the virtual. Anne-Lise François’s theor-
isation of ‘uncounted experience’ provides a powerful model for thinking
outside of the sequential logic that informs many notions of agency (from
context to decision to consequence). François argues for an agential calculus
that attends to ‘the imaginative possibilities revelation may either open or
eclipse’.6 While Hardy’s novels foreclose future possibilities, the
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counterfactual imagination allows his characters to negotiate contextual
differences such as social class and gender in a fictional past rather than the
present moment. The counterfactual agency of Hardy’s characters reflects
the agency of the novelist himself, whose fictional narratives default to the
past-tense imagination of what could have occurred in the past, but did not.
Unlike deliberate action, the contingency of the impulsive act nourishes a
powerful counterfactual ache. A lack of cause or convincing reason why one
state of affairs prevails over another inspires the feeling that things really could
be different.7 Charged with affect, the counterfactual takes on flesh and bleeds
into the actual, no longer in the form of a conditional but as an existential fact:
what did not happen happens in a different way. Acknowledging the reality of
counterfactual contexts forms one of the most difficult and deeply ethical acts
in Hardy’s novels. Keenly aware of the injustices arising from the maldistribu-
tion of resources and the socioeconomic prejudice of English culture, Hardy
also explores the possibility of loving-kindness to arise in situations where
social contexts such as gender, class, and heredity would shut it down.
Affect forms the fault line at the heart of Hardy’s determinism where the
prism of counterfactuality multiplies and enriches the givenness of context.
As I show in the next section, Hardy’s novels A Pair of Blue Eyes and The
Woodlanders foreground impulsivity to complicate the relation between
deterministic causality and social context. While this relation remains
central to Tess of the D’Urbervilles, it includes a counterfactual element that
places virtual contexts on the same moral plane as actual ones. Exceeding
the contexts of decision making, Thomas Hardy’s impulse challenges the
limits of agency by connecting those limits to novel writing itself.
Impulsive contexts
For Hardy, impulsive actions cut across the temporal gaps between past,
present, and future.8 As he writes in his autobiography, he ‘consider[s] a
social system based on individual spontaneity to promise better for happiness
than a curbed and uniform one under which all temperaments are bound to
shape themselves to a single pattern of living’.9 Action based on moral prin-
ciple contributes to a safe existence, but undermines what is unpredictable,
dangerous, and enjoyable about human experience. In his notes, Hardy
makes plans to ‘[w]rite a history of human automatism, or impulsion –
viz., an account of human action in spite of human knowledge, showing
how very far conduct lags behind the knowledge that should really guide
it’.10 Both spontaneous and untimely, the impulsive act is defined by the
moment it occurs. This moment, however, cannot be understood as part of
a temporal sequence, since the conditions that motivate an impulse appear
only in the aftermath of rationalising self-reflection. The word impulse,
Hardy writes, suggests ‘a driving power’ and ‘a spasmodic movement’.11 It
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is a momentary reprieve from temporal causality – a synchronic flash that dis-
rupts the linear sequence of past to present to future.
To circumvent the responsibility of deciding, Hardy’s characters often
resolve ethical dilemmas impulsively, which offers them partial relief from
the contexts that determine their actions. While Hardy’s characters often
appear passive in the face of powerful forces such as evolution, heredity,
and modernisation, the impulsive act’s missing interval of deliberation tests
the limits of context and personal agency. The impulsive act mitigates
moral responsibility not by the subordinating agency to impersonal forces,
but through the bewildering rush of affect arising from highly charged situ-
ations. In Hardy’s A Pair of Blue Eyes, for example, stimulating events often
provoke impulsive behaviour that ignores contextual codes such as class or
birth. In this novel, the young Elfride Swancourt falls in love with the
equally immature architect, Stephen Smith, despite her father’s objection to
Stephen’s humble background. When Stephen travels to India to make his
fortune, Elfride shifts her affections to Stephen’s friend, the worldly and yet
sexually immature man of letters, Henry Knight. Unable to come to terms
with the fact that Elfride was romantically involved with someone before
himself, Knight breaks off the engagement. The novel ends when Elfride
marries a nearby lord for the sake of her father’s vanity, dying shortly
afterward.
Despite the discrepancy in social class between Elfride and Stephen, acting
impulsively allows both characters to transgress the restrictions placed on
their relationship. Described as an ‘impulsive inconsequent girl’, Elfride over-
comes her awkward encounters with Stephen through a series of interjections:
‘“Don’t you tell papa, will you, Mr. Smith, if I tell you something?” she said
with a sudden impulse to make a confidence’.12 As the two characters
become increasingly intimate, Elfride’s lack of reserve inspires a reciprocal
overflow of feeling on the part of Stephen: ‘Stephen flushed hot with impulse
…“We will be wife and husband before we part for long!”’.13 Hardy replaces
what we might expect Stephen to flush hot with – passion, love, desire – with
something that is only ambiguously a feeling, and more often understood as a
catalyst for the action or expression of an emotion: impulse.
To feel impulsive is to be in a state of excitement or sensitivity where one’s
normal procedures for action have been suspended, adhering instead to the
ebb and flow of stimuli:
Elfride’s emotion was cumulative, and after a while would assert itself on a
sudden. A slight touch was enough to set it free – a poem, a sunset, a cunningly
contrived chord of music, a vague imagining, being the usual accidents of its
exhibition.14
A poem, a sunset, a chord, or mere imagining – the spur toward impulsive
action is interchangeable. Unlike emotions such as love or passion, where
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the object of the emotion takes central importance, for impulse the provoca-
tion matters more than the ‘who’ or ‘what’ doing the provoking. While an
impulsive action might be traced back to a poem or a sunset, it could just
as easily have been something else. Thus, the resulting action is not rationally
bound up with its immediate cause so much as tied to the affective force it
produces in the individual. Impulsive action arises from the intensity but
not the content of a context – it gives rise to an action that disrupts the
causal genealogy that organises everyday behaviour.
Stephen and Elfride overcome the obstacle of class and birth by the inten-
sity of the stimuli that affect them, freeing them – briefly – from contextual
entrapment.15 Mismatched as to social station and explicitly forbidden
from romantic attachment by Elfride’s father, the couple must sidestep a
double imperative: the demands of social norms and filial duty. When the
two lovers make plans to elope, impulse provides a means of ignoring these
duties: ‘All she cared to recognise was a dreamy fancy that to-day’s rash
action was not her own. She was disabled by her moods, and it seemed indis-
pensable to adhere to the programme’.16 Hardy’s language registers the trace
of moral agency inherent in the outcome of the impulsive decision: Elfride
makes a choice to bracket out the awareness of everything except the impul-
sive act itself, which provides a dissociative relief from the consequences of her
actions. Impulse tends to scramble the intelligibility of moral causality:
So strangely involved are motives that, more than by her promise to Stephen,
more even than by her love, she was forced on by a sense of necessity of
keeping faith with herself, as promised in the inane vow of ten minutes ago.17
What seems like a betrayal of class hierarchy, decorum, and parental authority
in the name of love is in fact a commitment to acting impulsively, further
insulating Elfride from responsibility for her actions.
Or, so it seems. And this semblance enables the romance between Elfride
and Stephen to reach the crisis of their failed elopement. As a means of escap-
ing the disabling context of one’s own situation, impulse can never be more
than an aspiration: a calculated attempt to overcome the obstacles that
thwart one’s will by imaginatively suspending the will altogether. In the
love story between Henry Knight and Elfride, references to impulse dominate
the couple’s early romantic encounters. Already betrothed to Stephen, Elfride
cannot act on her deepening attachment to Knight. Yet after she rescues
Knight from a near death experience, the two were ‘[m]oved by an impulse
neither could resist’: ‘it was impossible for two persons to go nearer to a
kiss than went Knight and Elfride during those minutes of impulsive
embrace’.18 Impulsive behaviour once again overcomes a contextual obstacle,
though here it is not the prohibition of class or heredity but Elfride’s own
promise to Stephen. The process of overcoming her past promise takes the
form of the agency annihilating impulse: ‘She dismissed the sense of sin in
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her past actions, and was automatic in the intoxication of the moment’ and
later ‘I did not meditate any such thing… It only happened so – quite of
itself’.19 Impulse covers its tracks by concealing the vectors of desire that
imply premeditation.
Like A Pair of Blue Eyes, Hardy’s The Woodlanders posits impulse as a
means of wish-fulfilment; however, the later novel greatly complicates the
ethical dimension of decision making. The Woodlanders focuses on a
woman who serves as the object of desire for two men. Grace Melbury, the
daughter of a successful timber merchant, is educated far beyond the ordinary
dweller of Little Hintock, which creates a gap between Grace and her
intended, the woodsman Giles Winterborne. Grace eventually marries the
gentleman doctor and philanderer Edgar Fitzpiers. Fitzpiers, however,
strikes up an affair with the widow Felice Charmond, while Grace revives
her relationship to her old lover. When both Winterborne and Charmond
die, the novel concludes with the dubious reconciliation of Grace and
Fitzpiers.
In The Woodlanders, Hardy makes the desires of his characters more
amorphous and uncertain. For example, Fitzpiers’s impulsive decision to
marry Grace Melbury short-circuits his desire to rise in the social hierarchy:20
‘Over and above the genuine emotion which she raised in his heart there hung
the sense that he was casting a die by impulse which he might not have thrown
by judgment’.21 His impulsive proposal to Grace reflects his last minute aban-
donment of a practice in Budmouth for the sake of an affair with Mrs. Char-
mond: ‘Why had he carried out this impulse – taken such wild trouble to effect
a probable injury to his own and his young wife’s prospects? His motive was
fantastic, glowing, shapeless as the fiery scenery about the western sky’.22
Where in A Pair of Blue Eyes impulse fulfils forbidden desires, The Woodlan-
ders complicates the motives that inspire impulsive behaviour. Fitzpiers’s
decision doesn’t make sense: ‘[t]here was every temporal reason for
leaving’, he muses, but ‘could he find it in his heart… to go away? No’.23
While sexual desire provides cause enough for Fitzpiers’s affair, we should
take Hardy’s insistence on the motivelessness of the act seriously. Can the
motive for an impulse be rationalised and pieced together from its conse-
quences, or does it remain an enigma of its momentary and spontaneous
occurrence, a ‘fantastic, glowing, shapeless’ thing?
Hardy undermines the attempt to reconstruct the motive of an impulse in
retrospect. Recovering from a severe illness, Winterborne allows Grace to
sleep in his house during a storm so she can hide from her husband. He
rests in a leaky shed and becomes sicker, eventually dying in the arms of
his old lover. When Grace observes his emaciated body, ‘she firmly believed
he was dying. Unable to withstand her impulse she knelt down beside him,
kissed his hands, and his face, and his hair, moaning in a low voice, “how
could I – how could I!”’.24 In the face of Winterborne’s imminent death,
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she impulsively puts aside the strictures of propriety. Ostensibly referring to
her request for shelter, Grace’s exclamation – ‘how could I – how could I!’
– registers her sense of responsibility for Winterborne’s fatal attachment to
herself. The juxtaposition of her exclamation with her impulsive action ges-
tures to the wider implications of impulse, as her decision to leave her
husband without a definite plan shifts the responsibility for her actions to
someone else. In The Woodlanders’s original publication in Macmillan’s
Magazine Grace’s exclamation is phrased as a double question: ‘How could
I? How could I?’25 While the rhetorical effect of this phrasing suggests
Grace’s crushing realisation of her guilt, it retains a trace of disbelief in her
own culpability that is verified by its repetition: ‘How could I?’
Hardy insists that the consequences of impulsive actions cannot be traced
back to the moral agent, but rather attributed to the impersonal operation of
impulse itself. When Mrs. Charmond begins her affair with Fitzpiers, ‘[s]he
had never so clearly perceived till now that her soul was being slowly
invaded by a delirium which had brought about all this; that she was losing
judgment and dignity under it, becoming an animated impulse only, a
passion incarnate’.26 Charmond’s affair does not begin with an impulsive
act (it is in fact carefully calculated); rather, the affair itself propels her into
a state of increasing impulsiveness. She begins to lose touch with basic
human qualities, becoming ‘an animated impulse’ and ‘a passion incarnate’.
Such abstract states of being take her beyond moral considerations: how is
it possible to assign blame if one’s existence is predicated on the absence of
time to deliberate? The focus falls not on the singular impulsive act but on
the extended impulsive condition. In this state the question of motive
becomes more vexed: while impulsivity could provide the means for Mrs.
Charmond to continue the affair, it could just as easily be the means of
ending it.
The impulsive condition obscures the causal circuitry of means and end. Is
acting impulsively an instinct or habit? Or is it a form of wish fulfilment that
represses one’s agency? Caroline Sumpter argues that Hardy draws on evol-
utionary discourse as a means of relating instinct, impulse, and habit to the
sympathetic sense, resulting in ‘a biological basis for ethical action’.27
However, A Pair of Blue Eyes and The Woodlanders suggest that alongside
the impulse as an instinctual reaction is the impulse oriented toward future
desires. Impulsivity overdetermines motive through a bewildering amplitude
of feeling. Right and wrong still carry a significant moral charge in Hardy’s
work, but alongside a sense of moral rationality exist actions that are cut
out of the causal fabric that allows the reader to assign guilt or blame.28 To
weigh these impulsive actions requires a calculus where the language of mor-
ality gives way to an affective lexicon of intensity and timing, force and
momentum, resistance and inertia.
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Sins of inadvertence and the counterfactual imagination
Critics tend to fall on one side or the other when it comes to the question of
Tess’s agency. For example, Gillian Beer argues for Tess’s passivity by noting
her character’s affinity with the natural world.29 In contrast, Elisha Cohn
claims that Hardy’s novel ‘ultimately endorses a concept of agency’ by
showing how Tess’s character wavers between the discourse of the creature
and the Deleuzian one of becoming-animal.30 The discussion of impulsive
behaviour, however, complicates the concept of agency even further by blur-
ring the distinction between activity and passivity on the part of the individ-
ual. Instead of choosing between activity and passivity, Tess testifies to the
difficulty of distinguishing between the two conditions. By doing so, Hardy
orients the reader’s attention away from contextual questions having to do
with motive and moral responsibility to formal considerations such as
timing and affective intensity. Though Tess’s narrative seems to shut down
free will in favour of deterministic forces, the novel privileges the aspiration
of characters to detach themselves from the oppressive context in which
they find themselves. As the repentant Angel muses, ‘the beauty or ugliness
of a character lay not only in its achievements but in its aims and impulses’.31
This often unsuccessful aspiration occurs in response to an overwhelming
rush of emotion and desire that holds one’s possibilities in suspense.
During this transformative interval questions of agency become temporally
inverted, ironically poised between the openness of the past and the determi-
nation of the future.
One of Tess’s acute anxieties relates to her sense of being caught in the
machinery of fate, a cruelly propulsive force that grinds down individual
difference as it moves inexorably forward. As she tells Angel Clare, ‘what’s
the use of learning that I am one of a long row only – finding out that
there is set down in some old book somebody just like me, and to know
that I shall only act her part… The best is not to remember that your
nature and your past doings have been just like thousands’ and thousands’,
and that your coming life and doings ’ll be like thousands’ and thousands’.32
As J. Hillis Miller points out, Hardy’s concern was not to show actual rep-
etition – in nature or between individuals – but to draw attention to the ‘incli-
nation for people… to trace likes in unlikes’ and to see ‘the old again in the
new’.33 In other words, Tess’s lament does not verify the inescapability of
determination and fate, but registers her feeling of helplessness in relation
to the powerful coercion of past and future. Instead of emphasizing the neces-
sity of a naturalistic world, the novel underlines the affect that this belief
creates in the individual. Tess’s recognition of her place within a rigidly
defined temporal genealogy – the future repeats the present, which repeats
the past – is significant not as it rises to level of a philosophic principle, but
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rather in the feelings of confinement and despair that the belief produces in
her character.
With Tess, Hardy captures the feeling that arises when one confronts coer-
cive individuals like Alec D’Urberville or cosmic forces such as the ‘Unfulfilled
Intention’.34 Tess explains her view of the future when she says to Angel,
you seem to see numbers of tomorrows just all in a line, the first of them the
biggest and clearest, the others getting smaller and smaller as they stand
farther away; but they all seem very fierce and cruel, as if they said, “I’m
coming! Beware of me! Beware of me!”.35
Her speculative language – ‘you seem to see’ – puts less emphasis on the ver-
ifiability of determination than in its affective consequences, the despair that
arises in the face of an ominous future beyond one’s control. Tess’s thoughts
about the future are countered by her reflections on the past. As she takes on
her father’s duty of driving the cart to market, the past furnishes Tess with the
comforting possibility of imaginative revision as she explains what an
unblighted planet would look like to her brother Abraham: ‘Well, father
wouldn’t have coughed and creeped about as he does, and wouldn’t have
got too tipsy to go this journey; and mother wouldn’t have been always
washing, and never getting finished’.36 Similarly, when Angel asks Tess why
she looks ‘woebegone’, she replies, ‘Just a sense of what might have been
with me! My life looks as if it has been wasted for want of chances!’.37 In a
surprising reversal, while the future is foreclosed and fills Tess with dread,
the past could have been different.
When Tess imagines ‘what might have been with me’, she reflects upon the
brief history of her son, Sorrow.While the rape of Tess has attracted the atten-
tion of critics since the novel’s publication, the death of Sorrow preoccupies
Tess when Angel courts her at Talbothays. Andrew Miller calls this emphasis
on what could have happened in the past the optative, a mode of self-for-
mation that ‘understands one’s past through an acknowledgement of what
one has not done, what one has not been’.38 Miller links the optative with
the figure of the dead child, which
throws us back across the chessboard of our possibilities to the thought that the
past might have been different, that we might be different now – not that we
might one day live again but that they might not on one day have died. The
presence of a child encourages the thought that the future might be different;
the presence of a dead child forces the thought that the past could have been
different.39
Sorrow might not have died, he might not have been conceived: the ‘lateral
prodigality’ of such counterfactuals contrasts with the way Tess understands
herself as an individual whose pre-formed future glares menacingly back-
ward.40 The past holds out the possibility of human agency while the future
remains grimly foreclosed. As the narrator summarises Tess’s thoughts, the
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past can be destroyed in a way that the as-yet unformed future cannot: ‘To
escape the past and all that appertained thereto was to annihilate it’.41
The counterfactual activity in Tess of the D’Urbervilles inverts the norma-
tive sequence of temporal rationality, where the past is history, the present an
interval of choice, and the future a horizon of possibility. In this novel, Tess
looks upon the future as cruelly determined while the past provides the raw
material for a flurry of speculation. One of the central questions of the
novel relates to the cognitive work that goes on between the two in the
present moment of decision making. As in A Pair of Blue Eyes and The Wood-
landers, Tess experiments with the minimum requirements of a decision.
Impulse functions as a temporal hinge between decision and indecision, the
smallest unit of time that marks the passage between these two states. The
alacrity of the transition makes the passage from indecision to decision invis-
ible, its span too short for conscious thought to register.42 The impulsive
decision bypasses the present moment of consciousness and becomes recog-
nisable in the past: its status as a decision only arises as a backformation from
events that already transpired. Thus, while the present slips away and the
future’s openness fills her with a sense of inevitability, Tess’s rewriting of
the past feeds back (or forward) into shaping the contexts that delimit her
agency.
This inversion of Tess’s feeling toward the past and future derives from her
impulsive reaction to moments of affective intensity in the present. As she
wanders home from a market-fair, Tess’s fellow-workers criticise her for
attracting Alec’s sexual interest. When Alec rides up to the group and dis-
covers Tess’s ill-treatment, he offers her succour in the form of a quick ride
away on his horse:
coming as the invitation did at the particular juncture when fear and indigna-
tion at these adversaries could be transformed by a spring of the foot into a
triumph over them, she abandoned herself to her impulse, put her toe upon
his instep, and leapt into the saddle behind him.43
Car Darch’s mother anticipates the consequences of Tess’s impulsive decision
when she quips, ‘Out of the frying pan into the fire’.44 This scene suggests the
dilemma between determination and free will: is the context to blame or
Tess’s poor decision? But Tess’s ‘large and impulsive nature’ troubles this
dichotomy.45 Context matters because it provokes Tess to decide; however,
she does not decide to accept Alec’s help but to abandon herself to impulse.
Her choice is not to choose: an act of resignation that separates Tess’s impul-
siveness from her conscious thought.
In Tess of the D’Urbervilles impulsive actions often play a role in scenes of
high moral stakes, where the rigours of conscious deliberation contrast with
affective faculties such as sympathy and intuition. When Tess observes a
flock of wounded pheasants she euthanizes the birds with ‘the impulse of a
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soul who could feel for kindred sufferers as much as for herself’.46 This auto-
matic response precedes moral calculation: her ‘first thought was to put the
still-living birds out of their torture’.47 The rationale comes in hindsight, as
she makes a connection between her own suffering and that of the birds.
Both are victims of arbitrary and violent social practices, where those who
have been wounded are not recuperated but turned into sacrifices for the
amusement of those in power. Tess’s impulse is that of a fellow sufferer
whose body responds as if by reflex to the imposition of a strong stimulus.
The spur to impulsive action is not always so overt, nor the rationale so
distinct. When Tess witnesses Alec’s transformation from a libertine to a reli-
gious zealot she reflects on the reasons behind his conversion. The narrator
reports in free indirect discourse, seemingly following the trajectory of
Tess’s own thoughts: ‘she would admit the ungenerous sentiment no
longer. D’Urberville was not the first wicked man who had turned away
from his wickedness to save his soul alive’.48 Her thoughts, however, do not
reach the clarity of the narrator’s discourse about them and remain in an
amorphous and inarticulate state: ‘Such impressions as these moved her
vaguely, and without strict definiteness. As soon as the nerveless pause of
her surprise would allow her to stir, her impulse was to pass on out of his
sight’.49 The narrator’s report of Tess’s consciousness does not capture the
formlessness of her thoughts. She acts on impulse rather than a definite
reason, such as Alec’s wicked appearance or his questionable motives. In
her acceptance of Alec’s offer of help, her mercy killing of the wounded phea-
sants, and her confused recognition of a transformed Alec, Tess lapses into an
impulsive state where her decisions only take on the appearance as such
because of a rationalising narrative voice that confers moral intelligibility
on events.
The slippage between Tess’s impulsive actions and the narrator’s descrip-
tion of them speaks to Hardy’s ambivalence about impulse. While he is
impressed by what the impulse enables people to do – temporarily allowing
Tess the ability to act without deciding, beyond the limitations of context –
he also expresses concern about the consequences of this unhinged behaviour.
Hardy resembles Angel Clare, who reflects with morbid fascination upon
Tess’s murder of Alec:
By degrees he was inclined to believe that she had faintly attempted, at least,
what she said she had done; and his horror at her impulse was mixed with
amazement at the strength of her affection for himself, and at the strangeness
of its quality, which had apparently extinguished her moral sense altogether.50
With equal parts awe and horror, Angel marvels at how the impulse catapults
the individual into making a decision. The impulse circumvents the smallest
and yet most crucial temporal interval that marks the transition between
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indecision and decision, destabilising the normative procedure for determin-
ing responsibility for one’s actions.
The impulse’s scrambling effect on morality reflects Tess’s dazed sense of
agency and social justice:
Never in her life – she could swear it from the bottom of her soul – had she ever
intended to do wrong; yet these hard judgments had come. Whatever her sins,
they were not sins of intention, but of inadvertence, and why should she have
been punished so persistently?51
Philosophical questions about intention recede to the background as society’s
judgments come crashing upon her, leaving Tess increasingly disconnected
from the consciousness of ethical deliberation. After Tess murders Alec,
Angel observes ‘that his original Tess had spiritually ceased to recognise the
body before him as hers – allowing it to drift, like a corpse upon the
current, in a direction dissociated from its living will’.52 Kaja Silverman con-
tends that the gaze plays an important role in Tess’s formation as a subject:
she understands herself as a person who is gazed upon.53 However, this
passage suggests that after Tess murders Alec she ceases to identify herself
with the object of the male gaze: ‘she spiritually ceased to recognise the
body before him as hers.’ But instead of gaining agency in return, she
lapses into a passive state animated by the swirl of stimuli that surround
her (‘like a corpse upon the current’). Thrown into contexts that shut down
her agency, Tess abandons herself to powerful flows of affect that disconnect
her decisions from the specific causes that motivate them.
Between the crushing determination of context and the radical irresponsi-
bility of impulsivity, Hardy identifies an alternative possibility in ‘the religion
of loving-kindness’.54 The term loving-kindness appears often in Hardy’s
novels.55 Sometimes it refers to acts of kindness that go against the grain of
socially prescriptive behaviours. But loving-kindness also suggests an atten-
tiveness that goes beyond ordinary perception. The narrator of The Woodlan-
ders reflects:
What people saw of [Grace Melbury] in a cursory view was very little; in truth,
mainly something that was not she. The woman herself was a shadowy, conjec-
tural creature… a shape in the gloom, whose true description could only be
approximated by putting together a movement now and a glance then, in
that patient and long-continued attentiveness which nothing but watchful
loving-kindness ever troubles to give.56
The real Grace does not appear all at once, but through a slow process of ima-
ginative conjecture based on the observation of her actions and mannerisms.
Without lapsing into fantasy or escapism, loving-kindness holds together the
aspects of human experience that disappear when attention is focused only on
verifiable causes such as social context.
12 J. JEWUSIAK
For Hardy, true loving-kindness is at once a perverse and deeply ethical act:
for Tess, the death of Sorrow places her at a counterfactual impasse, where the
desire to resurrect her child (what if he had not died?) exists alongside the
desire to annihilate him (what if he had not been born?). If the past represents
a site of possibility and agency, it also forms an arena of ambiguous morality
that pulls the individual between dubious and irreconcilable desires. Loving-
kindness holds together multiple possibilities in a fascinating and shocking
simultaneity, judging character not only by the actions that one committed,
but also by the actions that one did not commit – the history that could
have been, but was not. Hardy’s poem ‘Tess’s Lament’ distills the novel’s
counterfactual turn into an anguished cry against the writtenness of her past:
I cannot bear my fate as writ,
I’d have my life unbe;
Would turn my memory to a blot,
Make every relic of me rot,
My doings be as they were not,
And what they’ve brought to me!57
Tess imagines herself with an author’s agency over her own character, with
the ability to rewrite – or blot out – the narrative of her life. The novel’s
despair does not arise from these imagined negations, but from the characters
who continually withhold this counterfactual consideration from the judg-
ment of Tess’s life.
Conclusion
Because of the difficulty determining the motive of an impulsive act – whether
it arises from habit, anticipation, or desire – the specific situations in which
moral agents find themselves are of the utmost importance (since some
aspect of the context provides the stimulus to impulsivity), yet context does
not help in formulating questions to which there can be a satisfying
answer. The same impulsive act could be provoked by the glint of sunlight
on a patch of snow or a kind gesture to someone in need – the motivation
for the act is linked merely in terms of sequence and intensity and lacks the
epistemological force of causal or rational explanations. Acting impulsively
enables Hardy’s characters to overcome contextual difficulties such as social
class and heredity because there is simply no time to consider them.
Many nineteenth-century novelists code impulse negatively as replacing
sympathy with self-interest and rational deliberation with irrational desires.
For example, George Eliot’s characters grapple with the monumental
difficulty of making the right decision in a given set of circumstances. A
poorly made decision can lock an individual (like Bulstrode of Eliot’sMiddle-
march) into a ‘train of causes’ from which there is no escape.58 One of the
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most problematic decisions in Eliot’s oeuvre is made by Gwendolen Harleth
as she watches her husband drown. Hesitating a moment before attempting to
rescue Grandcourt, she later tells Daniel that ‘I held my hand, and my heart
said, “Die!”’.59 Daniel rationalises Gwendolen’s account of her actions as
giving ‘the character of decisive action to what had been an inappreciably
instantaneous glance of desire’.60 Gwendolen’s impulsive decision – her hes-
itation to save the life of a man that she hates – draws forth the implications of
context. It is precisely because of the impulsivity of her decision that Daniel
and Gwendolen immediately begin investigating the past contexts that
could have motivated her behaviour. In the universe of George Eliot’s
novels, George Levine writes, nothing ‘is explicable without reference to the
time and place in which it occurs or exists’.61 The more irrational and inex-
plicable the decision, the more one must rely upon context to explain it.
But in Hardy’s novels impulse takes on an ambivalent moral charge as the
aspiration to override the disabling contexts that circumscribe one’s will.
Instead of privileging the carefully planned decision as the epitome of social
morality, Hardy consistently turns to impulse as the moment where one’s
agency is paradoxically most active and disabled: at once outside of the deter-
mination of context and yet paralysed by the lack of time to deliberate. This
excluded middle between determination and free will flickers during impulse’s
thin sliver of time and energises Hardy’s novels with the pain and surprise of
contingency. It is the hap of impulse that draws one into such achingly close
proximity to the counterfactual. What could have been slides into a state of
affective immediacy that blurs the boundaries between the virtual and the
actual: Tess’s sorrow takes on flesh, becomes Sorrow.
The counterfactual, then, takes on the weight of an existential fact and
forces the analysis of agency to work in reverse: not archeologically to the con-
texts that enable or disable a decision, but to the horizon of counterfactual
contexts that the decision produces. This shift in focus reveals the ethical
implication of decisions that hardly seem to warrant the name, where
action occurs within the virtual realm of the counterfactual. As Hardy’s
impulsive characters navigate these counterfactual realms, they treat their
own past in fictional rather than historical terms. To be a character in
Hardy’s novels means recognising one’s self as such, attentive to the contin-
gencies immanent in the unfurling of one’s own story. And as the readers
of Hardy’s novels we are urged to multiply each character by his or her
shadow selves: to consider a world where Tess does not conceive her child
alongside the one where she does, a world where Tess murders Alec D’Urber-
ville alongside one where she does not. The significance of such speculations
suggests that agency over fictional worlds – for example, the narrative of one’s
life in the past – manifests itself in the real world as well, though often in a
diminished form. Thus, for Hardy the realisation of something creative,
outside of deterministic coercion, involves a complex negotiation between
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the past and future. Within his novels this takes the form of impulsive action:
by demonstrating that the past could have been different, the impulse opens
upon difference in the future. And this serves as a model for Hardy’s larger
inversion of realism’s imperative to represent the world faithfully: for as his
characters treat themselves like characters to gain control over their lives,
so too the fictional world has priority over the real world it ostensibly rep-
resents. The transposition of reality and fiction, Hardy suggests, provides
the best means of establishing agency over a purblind world that so often
shuts it down.
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